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Disclosure of Provisions for Decommissioning Costs in Annual Reports of Oil and Gas 
Companies: A Content Analysis and Stakeholder Views  
 
Abstract 
This study examines the extent of compliance with accounting disclosure requirements 
relating to provisions for decommissioning costs by oil and gas companies. We also 
investigate the views of stakeholders on the reporting practices of these companies. Using a 
content analysis approach, our findings reveal that compliance is substantially high, but 
companies tend to take a tick-box approach providing only minimum disclosure 
requirements. In semi-structured interviews, we find that disclosure decisions were driven by 
concerns about the credibility of information due to complexities in the accounting processes, 
regulatory requirements, lack of information demand  and proprietary costs. These findings 
have policy implications.    
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1. Introduction 
In this study, we examine disclosure practices relating to provisions for decommissioning 
costs by oil and gas companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Oil and gas 
companies have obligations to dismantle, remove and restore items of property, plant and 
equipment (PPE) at the end of their offshore and onshore operations and to remediate to 
agreed standards any environmental damage they may have caused (Hamzah, 2003; Standard 
and Poor’s, 2007; PwC, 2008; Gosling, 2017). These obligations are referred to as 
decommissioning.
1
 According to Standard and Poor’s (2007) and Rogers and Atkins (2015), 
the cost obligations for decommissioning are estimated to be equal to half of the oil and gas 
industry’s total debt. Similarly, with a focus on the North Sea alone, a report by the UK Oil 
and Gas Authority (2018) estimated decommissioning costs of all infrastructures at about 
£59.7 billion. Hence, the magnitude of decommissioning cost obligations in the oil and gas 
industry is substantial and is attracting significant attention from regulatory authorities and 
others (see Standard and Poor’s, 2007; Rogers and Atkins, 2015; Monciardini, 2016, UK Oil 
and Gas Authority, 2018).  
A major problem relating to decommissioning is that, whereas the obligation to 
decommission assets arises at the time the oil and gas assets are installed, the actual 
decommissioning activities are undertaken at the end of the productive life of the oil and gas 
assets (Khurana et al., 2001; Hamzah, 2003; Parente et al., 2006; Rogers and Atkins, 2015). 
This means that the actual decommissioning costs are only incurred by the company when the 
assets are no longer generating revenue, which could be several years after their first 
installation. It is in this context that existing accounting standards require oil and gas 
companies to make provisions for decommissioning costs from the installation stage of the 
assets and to review these annually. The rationale for requiring these provisions is to ensure 
that adequate funds are set aside by oil and gas companies to meet such large and mounting 
future obligations (Luther, 1996). This is critical because inadequate funding could have 
substantial consequences for a company’s cash flows and survival (Khurana et al., 2001). In 
particular, since the relevant oil and gas assets are no longer productive, the company would 
have to fund the decommissioning costs from other revenue generating projects or from 
selling its productive assets. At the extreme, if a company fails to meet the unfunded costs 
from its revenue generating projects or disposal of its assets, the burden might have to be met 
                                                 
1Decommissioning is defined in the Statement of Recommended Practice (OIAC. SORP, 2001) as “the process of plugging and abandoning 
wells, of dismantlement of wellhead, production and transport facilities and of restoration of producing areas in accordance with licence 
requirements and the relevant legislation” (para 88).  
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by the taxpayer to ensure that the environment is remediated (Hamzah, 2003; Parente et al., 
2006; Falconer and Wicks, 2016). Hence, the potential impact resulting from unfunded 
decommissioning costs could be enormous, not only to investors, but also to the wider 
stakeholders.  
 Given the estimated magnitude of the decommissioning obligations, coupled with the 
potential consequences of any funding gaps, attention has been directed towards the need for 
oil and gas companies to improve the disclosure of information about these obligations in 
their annual reports (see Standard and Poor’s, 2007; Rogers and Atkins, 2015; Monciardini, 
2016). The disclosure of these obligations by oil and gas companies is even more important in 
the context of increasing concerns about protecting the environment globally. Oil and gas 
companies, by the nature of their business, have a substantial impact on the environment, thus 
providing information about their operations is critical to stakeholders. In this regard, 
investors would be interested in information about decommissioning costs to help them to 
understand the risks posed by these obligations to the company’s future cash flows, 
particularly when they make decisions about share valuation (Barth et al., 2008). As shown by 
prior literature, for example, D’Souza et al., (2000), Boatsman et al. (2000) and Khurana et al. 
(2001), information about decommissioning cost provisions have share valuation relevance, 
that is, investors use this information. Other stakeholders such as environmental groups and 
the public in general would also be interested in this information as it will allow them to make 
informed judgements about the ability of the company to clean up the environmental damage, 
as well as to understand the potential impact on the taxpayer in the event that the company 
fails to honour obligations to decommission. The interest in this information by environmental 
groups and the public is exemplified in the case of Brent Spar where, the environmental 
group, Greenpeace, worked with the public and civil society to stop Shell plc from dumping 
its end-of-life assets in the North Sea (see Hamzah, 2003). In addition, to the extent that the 
taxpayer takes responsibility to remedy the environmental damage in the event that the 
company fails to pay the costs (Parente et al., 2006; Falconer and Wicks, 2016), both 
regulators and taxpayers would have a strong interest in the disclosures. This is in order to be 
able to satisfy themselves that companies are making appropriate plans to meet the obligations 
when they fall due. 
The accounting and reporting of the provisions for decommissioning costs are dealt 
with under IAS16 (Property, Plant and Equipment: PPE) and IAS37 (Provisions, Contingent 
Liabilities and Contingent Assets). However, a major challenge for oil and gas companies, 
according to Abrahamson (2014), Rogers and Atkins (2015) and HMRC (2016), is that 
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accounting for these costs is marred by substantial complexities and uncertainties. These 
derive from the timing, cost estimation, technological development, changes in oil prices, 
currency movements as well as changes to regulatory and tax regimes. Khurana et al. (2001) 
suggest that these complexities and uncertainties are likely to impede full disclosure of 
provisions for decommissioning costs by oil and gas companies due to concerns about the 
credibility of the information. This raises questions about whether oil and gas companies 
disclose sufficient information, specifically, to comply with the reporting requirements of 
IASs. Oddly, with the exception of Russell et al. (1998) and Rogers and Atkins (2015), there 
are no other studies examining the reporting practices of oil and gas companies relating to 
provisions for decommissioning costs. Even then, Russell et al. (1998) and Rogers and Atkins 
(2015) are only descriptive and do not provide an understanding of the reasons for the 
reporting practices. In addition, these studies examine compliance with Statement of 
Recommendaed Practice (SORP) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
requirements, respectively, but not with IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements, which have been 
adopted by the majority of countries since 2005. In this study, we extend these two studies by 
addressing three research questions:  
1- To what extent do oil and gas companies listed on the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE) comply with the disclosure requirements of the International Accounting 
Standards relating to provisions for decommissioning costs?
2
 
2- To what extent are the complexities and uncertainties in accounting for provisions 
for decommissioning costs perceived by selected key stakeholders as affecting the 
decisions of oil and gas companies to disclose such information in their annual 
reports? 
3- What other factors are perceived by selected key stakeholders to be influencing oil 
and gas companies’ disclosure decisions relating to the provisions for 
decommissioning costs? 
Using a mixed methods approach, involving a content analysis of annual reports and 
interviews with selected key stakeholders (i.e., oil and gas companies, regulators, oil and gas 
consultants, academics, oil and gas expert auditors), we report a number of findings.
3
 We find 
that the level of compliance with most of the disclosure requirements of IASs on 
                                                 
2The London Stock Exchange is divided into two markets: the Main Market and the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). The main market 
lists large and more mature or established companies, while the AIM is the market for smaller and growing companies with limited history. 
Our study sample of oil and gas companies is drawn from both markets.  
3Our original intention was to also include investors as one of the key stakeholders. However, we were unable to identify investors with an 
interest in the oil and gas sector to interview for this study. Hence, the findings reported in this study do not include the perception of 
investors. 
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decommissioning costs is substantially high. However, some companies tended to provide the 
very minimum required information in their annual reports. For example, in many cases, a 
single numerical figure for provisions for decommissioning costs was provided with no extra 
detail to aid understanding in terms of field, geographical location or timing of 
decommissioning. We also found a general consensus among the stakeholders that the 
existing IASs are adequate and provide a good basis for the reporting of provisions for 
decommissioning costs. However, due to the absence of historical precedents on the 
accounting treatment and reporting of decommissioning cost items, oil and gas companies 
want to see more guidance from accounting standard setters on both accounting and reporting 
of these costs. Further, we identify a number of factors that influence the disclosure practices 
of oil and gas companies. In particular, stakeholders identified the complex and uncertain 
processes in accounting for the provisions for decommissioning costs as creating a 
disincentive for companies to report the information. Specifically, the process of estimating 
costs and provisions was considered complex and uncertain, and too subjective, thus raising 
major concerns about the credibility of the resultant information and its use by stakeholders. 
Regulatory requirements (i.e., requirements of IASs 16 and 37) came out as driving 
disclosure by oil and gas companies, with companies only meeting the minimum 
requirements with little or no extra disclosures. Our findings also show that companies are 
not forthcoming with disclosures because they perceived external demand for the information 
as non-existent. Given this, it appears that the disclosure of provisions for decommissioning 
costs is not influenced by the desire to reduce agency-related costs or by any incentives to 
signal the quality of the company, with the expectation of reducing the cost of capital. 
Finally, disclosure decisions are influenced by proprietary costs. In particular, companies 
were concerned about competitive disadvantage, information misinterpretation by users and 
increased public scrutiny. 
Our study contributes to the literature and practice in a number of ways. Firstly, we add 
to the works of Russell et al. (1998) and Rogers and Atkins (2015). Whereas Russell et al. 
(1998) and Rogers and Atkins (2015) examine SORP or SEC requirements, respectively, we 
investigate compliance with IASs/IFRSs and also we consider international companies instead 
of just UK or US companies. Secondly, we provide evidence about the perceptions of selected 
stakeholders (i.e., companies, regulators, consultants, auditors and academics) on reporting 
practices relating to decommissioning costs and the factors perceived as influencing reporting 
practices. In this respect, in line with prior literature (e.g., Gibbins et al., 1990 and Luther, 
1996), we find that disclosure decisions are influenced by regulation, external demand for 
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information and proprietary costs. More importantly, we offer one of the first pieces of 
evidence showing that complexities and uncertainties in accounting for decommission costs 
affect disclosure decisions by oil and gas companies. Thirdly, we extend the existing literature 
by  examining compliance with IAS/IFRS in contexts where IAS/IFRS are voluntary (e.g., 
Street and Gray, 2001; Glaum and Street, 2003; Glaum et al., 2013) to a mandatory regulatory 
setting. Whereas the prior literature shows limited compliance, our work demonstrates high 
compliance, but no extra disclosure beyond requirements. Fourthly, we focus on specific 
accounting standards dealing with provisions for decommissioning costs, an important issue 
for the oil and gas sector, regulators, investor and other stakeholders (see Abrahamson, 2014; 
Rogers and Atkins, 2015; HMRC, 2016). Finally, our work provides evidence that is of value 
to policy-makers and practitioners with interest in enhancing the disclosure of 
decommissioning costs information and compliance with IAS/IFRSs. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the regulation 
and accounting for provisions for decommissioning costs. In Section 3, the literature is 
reviewed, and in Section 4, the research design is presented. Section 5 presents and discusses 
the findings. Finally, we provide a conclusion in section 6.  
2. Regulation of accounting for and reporting of decommissioning costs  
The oil and gas industry is international in nature and, therefore, subject to international 
regulations and laws which require the sector to decommission assets at the end of their 
production life (Techera and Chandler, 2015). The requirement to decommission oil and gas 
assets are dealt with by a number of international treaties including the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the Continental Shelf, the 1982 United Nations Convention on Law of Sea 
(UNCLOS) and the 1989 International Maritime Organization (IMO) Guidelines and 
Standards. However, these international treaties do not address accounting and reporting 
issues relating to decommissioning costs.  
The accounting and reporting of provisions for decommissioning costs are dealt with 
under different countries’ local accounting standards or IAS/IFRS. In the context of 
companies listed on the LSE, however, the oil and gas companies are required by the UK 
Listing Authority to comply with the measurement and disclosure requirements of IAS/IFRS. 
The specific accounting standards dealing with the accounting treatment for, and disclosure 
of, decommissioning costs are IAS16 (Property, Plant and Equipment: PPE) and IAS37 
(Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets). Additional guidance is provided in 
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IFRIC 1 Changes in Existing Decommissioning, Restoration and Similar Liabilities. IAS16 
states that ‘an item of property, plant and equipment that qualifies for recognition as an asset 
shall be measured at its cost’ and the components of such cost are ‘purchase price, directly 
attributable costs and initial estimate of the costs of dismantling and removing the item or 
restoring the site on which it is located’ (IAS16, 2001, para 16). Thus, at the time of 
installation of an oil and gas asset, the company is required to estimate the cost of 
decommissioning that asset. To this extent, the installation of the oil and gas assets gives rise 
to liabilities or obligations for decommissioning the assets. According to IAS37, a liability or 
an obligation exists when the company has no other alternative but to sacrifice economic 
benefits to settle the obligation or liability (IAS37, 2014). Since oil and gas companies are 
required by law to decommission their installations at the end of their productive capacity, the 
costs of decommissioning meet the definition of a liability under IAS37. Therefore, the 
estimated decommissioning costs, measured on a present value basis, are to be capitalised into 
the cost of the installation of the oil and gas asset as required by IAS16. The total cost of the 
asset, including the provisions for decommissioning costs, are to be depreciated over the 
useful life of the field. Thus, oil and gas companies are required to estimate decommissioning 
costs and, to create and fully recognise the provision on the balance sheet. 
In terms of reporting, listed firms must comply with the reporting requirements of 
IAS16 and IAS37 as required by the listing rules of the LSE. Under IAS16, companies are 
required to disclose the measurement bases used, the depreciation method used and the useful 
lives of the assets. Additionally, the gross carrying amount of assets at the beginning and the 
end of the period, showing additions, disposal, revaluations, depreciation, impairments losses 
and any other movements are also to be disclosed (Melville, 2011; Picker et al., 2016). The 
decommissioning costs form part of an oil and gas structure’s total costs. However, 
revaluation of decommissioning costs impacts the PPE total costs and therefore needs to be 
disclosed when taking place. With regard to IAS37, disclosure is required of: the carrying 
amount of provisions for decommissioning costs at the beginning and end of each financial 
period; additional provisions made during the period; amount of provisions used or removed 
during the period; a brief description of the nature of the obligation; the expected timing of 
any resulting expenditure; and an identification of involved uncertainties (Melville, 2011). 
The disclosure requirements of these two standards, together with IFRIC 1 guidance, have 
been used to construct a disclosure index (see Appendix 1 for details).  
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3. Literature review  
3.1 Theory 
According to Barth et al. (2008), IAS/IFRS are high quality standards and lead to quality 
information that is helpful to users in making economic decisions. The authors add, however, 
that the extent to which high quality information is achievable under IAS/IFRS depends upon 
whether companies comply with the requirements. In theory, for listed companies, universal 
compliance with IAS/IFRS would be expected because failure to comply attracts penalties 
from listing authorities (Robinson et al., 2011) and the stock market via an increase in the cost 
of capital (Verrecchia, 1990; Lambert et al., 2007). However, as pointed out by Robinson et 
al. (2011), this is only feasible if the authorities and the stock market can objectively assess 
noncompliance with reporting requirements. Given the complexities and uncertainties 
associated with the accounting for decommissioning cost provisions (see Abrahamson, 2014; 
Rogers and Atkins, 2015), policing of these disclosures might be difficult and costly. To the 
extent that listing authorities and the stock market are unable to effectively police compliance 
with disclosure requirements, oil and gas companies have discretion over what and how much 
information about provisions for decommissioning costs they disclose. Such decisions to 
disclose information involve a trade-off between benefits and costs of disclosure (see Coles et 
al., 1995; Lambert et al., 2007). If the benefits outweigh the costs, oil and gas companies are 
more likely to comply with IAS/IFRS requirements and, possibly, provide more details than 
required by accounting standards and/or regulations. A number of theories have been applied 
in the literature to explain disclosure decisions, including agency theory, signalling theory, 
stakeholder theory and proprietary cost theory.  
Both the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and signalling theory (Hughes, 
1986) suggest that companies disclose information to reduce information asymmetries 
between the company and its stakeholders, particularly the existing and potential 
shareholders. Specifically, the agency theory posits that disclosure reduces agency-related 
costs between shareholders and the management (Luther, 1996). In particular, it helps 
shareholders understand the operations and performance of the company, thereby enhancing 
their ability to monitor the actions and performance of the management. Similarly, signalling 
theory asserts that disclosure is a signal to the stock market about the quality of the company 
(Hughes, 1986) that helps to attract more investors, improving liquidity of the shares and 
consequently lowering the cost of capital (Coles et al., 1995; Lambert et al., 2007; Cuadrado-
Ballesteros et al., 2016). The underpinning assumption of this theory is that investors value 
more disclosure and companies have incentives to minimise the cost of capital. In this 
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context, companies with positive information (i.e. good news) would disclose more 
information to signal their quality to the capital market. Even companies with unfavourable 
information will have incentives to provide detailed information to reduce the probability of 
being considered ‘a lemon’ by investors (Akerlof, 1970). That is, failure to disclose might 
lead investors to perceive the company as withholding information that would reveal the 
worst and, hence, demand a lower price for the company’s shares. More disclosures provide 
an opportunity for the company to explain the unfavourable information and help to reduce 
the potential negative investor perception about its quality. Thus, based on these theories, oil 
and gas companies will provide decommissioning costs disclosures to lower information 
asymmetry between the companies and investors.  
 Decisions to disclose information about provisions for decommissioning costs can also 
be explained using the stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984; Mitchell et al., 1997). The theory 
argues that a company is a ‘nexus of contracts’ amongst a wide range of stakeholders and that 
these stakeholders have legitimate interests about the operations of the company. In this 
regard, in addition to investors, oil and gas companies’ other stakeholders, regulators, 
environmental activists groups, civil society and the public in general, may all be concerned 
about the decommissioning of oil and gas assets and the company’s ability to undertake such 
obligations. This is particularly relevant for oil and gas companies given that their operations 
have a substantial impact on the environment and the society. To the extent that information 
about decommissioning costs helps these stakeholders assess the company’s ability to meet its 
obligation to decommission the assets with minimum environmental damage, oil and gas 
companies would be expected to disclose the information. Disclosing the information might 
help reduce stakeholder concerns, leading to less scrutiny of the company’s operations and 
improving the company’s reputation in the public’s eye. 
Finally, proprietary cost theory (Dye, 1986; Verrecchia, 1990) can also be used to 
understand oil and gas companies’ reporting of information about provisions for 
decommissioning costs. This theory asserts that companies consider proprietary costs in 
making decisions about disclosure. These costs, in addition to the costs of developing and 
presenting the information, include competitive position costs and the potential that the 
information could be misinterpreted by the users and public scrutiny. First, if provisions for 
decommissioning costs are reflective of the additional investments for an oil and gas field, 
such information may aid competitors in assessing the attractiveness of a particular field or 
location. This may lead to new entrants into the particular oil and gas field with implications 
for the existing operators (Ellis et al., 2012). A second cost is rooted in the ability of investors 
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and other stakeholders to process information (e.g., Kim and Verrecchia, 1994; Coller and 
Yohn, 1997). Since accounting for decommissioning costs, particularly the estimation of the 
costs, is complex and uncertain, the information may also be difficult for users to process and 
interpret. For example, high estimates of provisions for decommissioning costs may be 
perceived by investors and other stakeholders as indicating the actual costs of 
decommissioning. This may lead the investors and other interested stakeholders to assess 
otherwise profitable oil and gas assets as inefficient, based on an assessment of the provisions 
for decommissioning costs, particularly in periods of low oil and gas prices. This has 
implications for: (i) an investor’s valuation of the company’s shares, and, consequently, its 
cost of capital (Lee et al., 1993); (ii) other stakeholders’ perception of the company’s ability 
to decommission the assets, leading to increased public scrutiny (Li et al., 1997). If these 
proprietary costs outweigh the benefits of disclosure of provisions for decommissioning costs, 
companies may not commit to providing the information. 
   
3.2 Related studies  
Our work relates to two streams of prior studies. The first stream of studies examines 
compliance with IAS in different contextual settings such as Australia (Tower et al., 1999), 
Germany (Glaum and Street, 2003; Glaum et al., 2013), Switzerland (Street and Gray, 2001), 
Gulf Co-operation states (Al-Shammari et al., 2008) and cross-country (Hodgdon et al., 
2009). With the exception of Al-Shammari et al. (2008), these studies find substantial non-
compliance with IASs and this could be due to the non-mandatory nature of IASs at the time. 
Al-Shammari et al. (2008) show increasing compliance with IASs since most stock exchanges 
started mandating adoption of IAS/IFRS in 2005. We differ from these studies in three main 
ways. Firstly, whereas all these prior studies examine compliance with several IASs 
addressing different disclosure issues, we take a different approach by focusing on a specific 
important, but rarely examined disclosure issue—provisions for decommissioning costs in the 
oil and gas sector. As noted earlier, the mounting decommissioning costs in the sector makes 
their disclosure important to aid stakeholders in making decisions. Secondly, we focus on 
companies listed on the LSE, a setting in which compliance with the IAS/IFRS is mandatory, 
so that the expectation is that compliance will be high. Thirdly and most importantly, instead 
of only relying on content analysis of annual reports, we also investigate stakeholder views on 
reporting practices relating to provisions for decommissioning costs and the factors perceived 
as influencing such practices.  
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The second stream of studies related to our study focuses on accounting disclosures by 
oil and gas companies, but has been limited to the disclosure of oil and gas reserves. This 
stream of studies has examined the determinants of oil and gas reserves disclosures (e.g., 
Malone et al., 1993; Berry and Wright, 2001; McChlery et al., 2015). None of these consider 
provisions for decommissioning costs. Only two studies have investigated the reporting of 
decommissioning costs by oil and gas companies. Russell et al. (1998) studied the state of 
accounting for the cost of abandoning North Sea oil and gas fields and showed that UK oil 
and gas companies exercised a high level of compliance with the regulations governing 
accounting for the cost of abandoning North Sea oil and gas fields as embedded in SORP. 
Rogers and Atkins (2015) analysed compliance of 146 US listed oil and gas companies with 
Assets Retirement Obligations (AROs) disclosure requirements of Statement of Financial 
Accounting Standard 143. They concluded that there is poor adherence by oil and gas 
companies to the AROs disclosure requirements. While these two studies provide some 
insights, they have not considered compliance with IAS/IFRS disclosure requirements for 
provisions for decommissioning costs. Further, these studies are only based on publicly 
available data and do not examine the views of stakeholders on company disclosure practices. 
They also do not investigate the factors affecting the disclosure practices. Our study addresses 
these issues. 
4. Research Design 
We employ a two-staged research approach to address our research questions. In the first 
stage, we content analyse annual reports of oil and gas companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange, both the Main Market and the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). We identify 
12 oil and gas companies from the Main Market and 110 companies from the AIM. We 
eliminate three companies from the Main Market and 11 companies from the AIM because 
they are not exploration and production companies. We eliminate a further 40 companies 
because they are at the start-up stage with no revenues and, thus, had no provisions for 
decommissioning costs to disclose. The resultant sample for the study is 68 companies and 
includes companies from different countries, thus representing a wide diversity in 
geographical location of operations (see Table 1). 
    Insert Table 1 about here 
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For each of the sample companies, we collect the latest annual reports published in the 
period 2014 and 2015 from the company’s websites. To measure the level of compliance with 
the reporting requirements of IAS/IFRS relating to the provisions for decommissioning costs, 
we applied the content analysis method. Content analysis has been extensively used in 
previous disclosure studies (e.g., Mangena and Pike, 2005; Hodgdon et al., 2009; Abdo and 
Al Drugi, 2012; Al Drugi and Abdo, 2014). We first developed a checklist of provisions for 
decommissioning cost disclosures as required by IAS16, IAS37 and IFRIC 1. This process 
identified 17 required items relating to disclosure of decommissioning costs (see Appendix 1). 
We then read the annual reports, in particular the financial statements, accounting policies and 
notes to the accounts to identify the information items. Each item was scored using a 
dichotomous scoring approach, where a score of 1 is awarded if disclosed and 0 otherwise.
4
 
We then constructed a disclosure compliance index for each company by dividing the total 
number of items reported in the annual report with the total number of items applicable to the 
company. This process was done by one researcher, but to ensure that the scores are reliable, a 
second researcher independently scored a selection of the annual reports, and the resulting 
scores were similar to those of the first researcher.  
In the second stage of the research, we carried out semi-structured interviews in order to 
garner the perceptions of oil and gas companies and other stakeholders on reporting practices 
relating to the provisions for decommissioning costs. This stage was designed to provide a 
better understanding of the compliance scores developed in stage 1 as well as to explore the 
factors influencing the reporting of provisions of decommissioning costs by oil and gas 
companies. Following the advice of Eisenhardt (1989), we sought to identify different 
stakeholder groups that were knowledgeable and experts on decommissioning and reporting 
practices to ensure that we could obtain expert views. In this regard, we wrote to the listed oil 
and gas companies used in the first phase of our study. We also contacted the UK Oil&Gas 
Authority (OGA), the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (DBEIS), 
academics, consultants, external auditors and investors. In total, 13 stakeholders agreed to 
participate in the semi-structured interviews. These were senior people in their organisations 
and included group accountants or finance officers from oil and gas companies; regulatory 
officers from the OGA and the DBEIS; external auditors specialising in the audit of oil and 
gas companies; independent oil and gas consultants; and expert academics at UK higher 
                                                 
4Our scoring approach does not capture the importance of the disclosure items. It is possible that the decisions to report is based on the 
perceived importance of the item, that is, companies disclose information items that they believe are important. However, Mangena and 
Pike (2005) examined disclosure on the basis of the importance of the items based on the perception of users of information. They find no 
significant difference between the two measures and concluded that companies disclose important information items as much as they do 
information that is perceived as less important.   
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education institutions. However, none of the investors we contacted responded to our requests 
for interviews. The list of interviewees and the length of each interview are as in Table 2.  
    Insert Table 2 about here 
 
In developing the interview guide, we considered the findings of the content analysis 
phase of the study as well as the disclosure literature. The interview guide addressed three 
main issues: the perceived importance of decommissioning cost information to stakeholders 
and its disclosure in the annual report; the accounting for provisions of decommissioning 
costs and impact on reporting practices; and factors affecting reporting of information about 
provisions for decommissioning costs. The semi-structured interviews took place between 
May and June 2016 and ranged from 22 to 60 minutes. To ensure consistency throughout, all 
interviews were conducted by one researcher. They were all audio recorded and then 
transcribed by the researchers. Where relevant, follow-ups were made to clarify the responses.  
5. Findings and Discussion 
In this section, we present and discuss our findings, structured around the research questions. 
Firstly, we discuss the results of the content analysis of annual reports. Secondly, we explore 
the views of stakeholders on the reporting practices on provisions for decommissioning costs. 
Thirdly, we draw from the disclosure literature to understand the factors influencing the 
decisions to disclose information about provisions for decommissioning costs.  
 
5.1. Compliance with IAS reporting requirements—A content analysis of annual reports 
Our first research question seeks to provide understanding of compliance with the reporting 
requirements of IAS by oil and gas companies. We address this question by undertaking a 
content analysis of annual reports. The results are presented in Table 3, Panels A and B.  
    Insert Table 3 about here 
 
In Panels A and B, we report summary descriptive statistics of the overall disclosure 
compliance scores, including the distribution of the scores across ranges. As Panel A 
indicates, the mean disclosure score is 0.634, implying that on average, oil and gas companies 
listed on the LSE comply with about 63.4% of the information required by the IASs. 
However, the problem with the overall mean is that it may be influenced by outlier disclosure 
items, in particular, items that may not necessarily be relevant to the company. Given this, we 
analyse individual disclosure items and observe that disclosure is substantially lower for items 
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1 and 12. Both are awarded very low scores (average of below 10%) compared to others (see 
table 4 for item by item disclosure scores). These items may unduly influence the level of 
overall disclosure compliance we are observing. Item 1 concerns disclosure “in the extremely 
rare cases”, for example, where reliable estimate cannot be made. In such cases, IAS37 
requires the costs of decommissioning to be treated as a contingent liability. It is possible, 
many companies may not have these extremely rare cases to disclose. With regard to item 12, 
“reimbursement of decommissioning costs” is not a common case, therefore it is expected that 
the compliance score for this item would be rather low. Given this reasoning, we eliminate 
these two items and re-analyse the disclosure compliance scores. The mean overall score 
improves significantly from 63.4% to 71.1% (see Panel A). These statistics present a picture 
of a high level of compliance with IAS16, IAS 37 and IFRIC 1 disclosure requirements. 
In Panel B, we examine the distribution of companies across disclosure compliance 
score ranges. This analysis is aimed at helping us to understand how companies are 
distributed across disclosure scores, thus providing additional insights into compliance with 
requirements. For the scores that include all items (that is, including 1 and 12 noted above), 
we observe that 20.5% of the companies provide less than 50% of the required information, 
26.5% are in the range 50% to less than 70% and 53.0% provide more than 70% of the 
information (of which only 2 companies, which is 2.9%, are fully compliant). When we 
eliminate items 1 and 2, the number of companies in the 70% to 100% disclosure compliance 
score range increases from 53.0% to 67.6% (Panel B) (of which 8 companies, which is 11.8%, 
are fully compliant).  
Taken together, our results suggest that the majority of companies exhibit high 
compliance with the reporting requirements of IASs on decommissioning cost provisions. 
However, full compliance is not achieved. Standard and Poor’s (2007) and Rogers and Atkins 
(2015) also show that companies do not fully comply with decommissioning cost disclosure 
requirements. In addition, and even more important, our analyses show that while compliance 
appears to be substantially high, some oil and gas companies only provide the very minimum 
information required, with little or no further details to aid understanding. For example, 
Empyrean Energy Plc states in its 2015 annual report (note 9, p. 40) that the company has 
recognised oil and gas decommissioning assets of $218,000 in 2014 and $252,000 in 2015. 
No further explanation is provided. Another example is in the annual report of Rose 
Petroleum Plc (2015: 36) which states:  
The decommissioning provision is calculated as the net present value of the Group’s 
share of the expenditure expected to be incurred at the end of the producing life of the 
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facility in the removal and decommissioning of the production, storage and 
transportation facilities currently in place. 
 
This implies that decommissioning of upstream and downstream facilities is grouped together 
in one account. No details of decommissioning of exploration and production facilities is 
made separately in the accounts or in the notes to the accounts of Rose Petroleum Plc. This 
practice is consistent with what Collins et al. (1993) refers to as a tick-box approach to 
compliance with the reporting requirements rather than engaging in the spirit of informative 
reporting. Therefore, whilst companies appear to comply with disclosure requirements, they 
are not providing detailed information to help stakeholders’ understanding and proper 
assessment of the financial implications of the costs and the ability of the company to meet 
their future obligations.  
We also observe that there are substantial variations in compliance with IAS reporting 
requirements in the sample of oil and gas companies (measured by the standard deviation, see 
Table 3, Panel A). We draw from the disclosure literature and examine two possible factors 
for these variations—company size and ratio of decommissioning costs to total assets.5 The 
results are presented in Table 4, Panels A and B. In Panel A, we compare the results of overall 
disclosure compliance scores and in Panel B, we analyse disclosure by individual items. 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
In relation to company size, the literature suggests that agency costs are size-related, 
with higher agency costs associated with larger companies (Collins et al., 1993; Malone et al., 
1993; Mangena and Pike, 2005; McChlery et al., 2015). Large companies are also more 
visible and likely to be under greater scrutiny by stakeholders. Thus, they would disclose 
more information to reduce the agency costs and public scrutiny (e.g., Glaum and Street, 
2003; Mangena and Pike, 2005; McChlery et al., 2015). In addition, we add that larger 
companies have resources and information systems to deal with the complexities and 
uncertainties related to the accounting for provisions for decommissioning costs. This allows 
them to gather and disclose more information about the provisions. To understand whether 
disclosure compliance differs by company size, we measure company size using a dummy 
variable taking 1 if the company is listed on the Main Market and 0 if it is listed on AIM. 
                                                 
5 We note that the disclosure literature has examined many factors using multiple regressions (e.g., governance factors, firm-specific 
factors, etc.). However, our aim is to understand compliance with disclosure practices and factors influencing such practices from the 
stakeholders’ perspectives, some of which may be difficult to capture in economic modelling. Given this, we do not undertake extensive 
statistical tests of these other factors as in prior literature. In addition, our sample size is generally too small to undertake multiple 
regressions as in prior studies. 
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Main Market-listed companies are generally larger than AIM-listed companies. Using this 
measure, we run independent t-tests statistics to determine whether there are differences 
between the two groups. We find that with the exception of items 2, 4 and 13, there are no 
significant differences between Main Market and AIM listed companies. Thus, on the whole, 
it appears that the size of a company does not affect compliance with IAS/IFRS disclosure 
requirements for provisions for decommissioning costs. 
The ratio of decommissioning costs to total assets reflects the company’s ability to meet 
its decommissioning obligations from its asset-base (Alciatore et al., 2004). In theory, high 
ratio companies would have incentives to provide more information about their provisions for 
decommissioning costs in order to signal to the capital market (Hughes, 1986) that they have 
adequate funds set aside to meet the high-levels of decommissioning obligations when they 
become due. This should maintain or improve investor confidence, reducing the negative 
effects on share prices and reducing the cost of capital (Coles et al., 1995; Lambert et al., 
2007). Similarly, from a stakeholder theory perspective (Freeman, 1984), they would comply 
and/or report more information about their ability to decommission their oil and gas assets 
with minimum impact to the environment and without recourse to public funds in order to 
allay concerns of stakeholders. We calculated the ratio of decommissioning costs to total 
assets using information in the annual reports, and then divided the companies into high and 
low ratios via the median and conducted independent t-tests (see Table 4). We find no 
significant difference  in the overall compliance score. Similarly, with the exception of items 
1, 5, 7 and 8, there are no observable differences for the individual items. However, on the 
whole, although the differences are not significant, the low ratio oil and gas companies appear 
to comply slightly more than the high ratio companies (Table 4, Panel B). One possible 
explanation is that the high ratio companies might be concerned about providing more 
information on decommissioning costs because such information might be misinterpreted and 
construed by stakeholders as indicative of future viability problems. That is, stakeholders 
might evaluate the company as being limited in its ability to meet future decommissioning 
obligations from its existing assets. This may have implications on the share price and 
consequently the company’s cost of capital. It can also potentially bring increased pressure on 
the company by stakeholders such as environmental activists groups and regulators to 
consider decommissioning earlier or to sell the assets to companies that may be considered 
financially stronger.  
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5.2. Stakeholder views relating to reporting of decommissioning information 
In this section, we address our second and third research questions. Research question 2 aims 
to explore stakeholders’ views about the complexities and uncertainties involved in the 
accounting for provisions for decommissioning costs and the impact they have on reporting 
practices. Khurana et al. (2001) suggested that complexities and uncertainties are major 
impediments to the reporting of decommissioning cost information. Research question 3 aims 
to provide an understanding of the other perceived factors influencing decisions by oil and gas 
companies to disclose information about provisions for decommissioning costs in annual 
reports. This research question is underpinned by the disclosure literature (see Healy and 
Palepu, 2001; Beyer et al., 2010). We present and discuss our findings under three issues—(i) 
importance of the annual report as an avenue for disclosing decommissioning cost 
information; (ii) accounting complexities and uncertainties; and (iii) factors affecting 
reporting practices.  
 
5.2.1 Decommissioning costs information and the annual report  
 
We started by asking the interviewees about whether they view information about provisions 
for decommissioning costs as important to their stakeholders and whether the annual report 
was the appropriate avenue to publish the information. Whilst the literature suggests that the 
disclosure of information relating to provisions for decommissioning costs in the annual 
reports is important and useful to users (see Boatsman et al., 2000; D’Souza et al., 2000; 
Khurana et al., 2001; Alciatore et al., 2004; Monciardini, 2016), no research has examined the 
views of key stakeholders on this issue. Our interviewees agree that the annual report is the 
most appropriate media to disclose information about provisions for decommissioning costs 
and that the information is important to stakeholders. In relation to the annual report as the 
appropriate avenue, the views are exemplified in comments by two oil and gas company 
interviewees: 
Well, I guess annual reports are the only place for this... Well, may be biased because I’m 
an accountant, so I can read and understand annual reports.  
Group Financial Controller, Oil and Gas company (O&GI1) 
 
In my opinion, they [Annual Reports] pretty much are at the moment the only source of 
information about decommissioning costs that is published externally by oil and gas 
companies.  …. you could say that they are very important.  
Group Financial Accountant, Oil and Gas company (O&GI2b) 
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Other interviewees concurred, but also stated that publishing the information in the annual 
reports could aid an understanding of the risks to the future cash flows of the company by 
providing an assessment of the potential impact of these future decommissioning liabilities. 
This implies, consistent with the literature, that information on provisions for 
decommissioning costs is of value to users of annual reports (see D’Souza et al., 2000; 
Khurana et al., 2001; Alciatore et al., 2004; Monciardini, 2016). Given the perceived 
importance of the information, some of the interviewees, particularly the non-oil and gas 
companies, went further and raised concerns about the limited information provided by the oil 
and gas companies. As commented by an academic interviewee (ACA2): 
I think, to an end user of the annual report, the more transparent the information, the 
clearer the information presented, the better view the user has of assessing some of the 
risks relating to it. I’ve got to say that the degree of disclosure about decommissioning 
always seems to be very brief, you never get any information that seems to be particularly 
useful... I think, the only thing you usually see is the discount rate. 
 
and a regulator interviewee, a senior accountancy advisor (GOV3) stated: 
 
Well, I think it’s actually very important, obviously [that is reporting decommissioning 
information in annual reports]. Decommissioning is a very significant part of the project 
costs. You are probably aware that in the North Sea alone, I mean to say, we are talking 
about tens of billions total decommissioning liability out there. And we do have some very 
significant and very large developments, ….. So, because of the sheer significance of 
decommissioning, it is vital, I think, for it to be accurately reported in annual reports and 
for users of those reports to be fully aware of the situation. So, there are investors, 
employees, contractors, sub-contractors and indeed government, we all have an interest in 
decommissioning being reported accurately.  
      
These comments are supportive of the literature calling for more information about provisions 
for decommissioning costs to be published in the annual report (Boone, 1998; Standard & 
Poor’s, 2007). The key question is, if key stakeholders, including the oil and gas companies 
themselves, view decommissioning costs as important for users, and the annual report as the 
most appropriate avenue for disclosing the information, why is there limited disclosure of the 
information in the annual reports of the oil and gas companies? We make an attempt to 
provide an understanding of this in the next two sections. 
 
5.2.2 Accounting for decommissioning and reporting practices 
As we noted earlier, the literature points to major complexities and uncertainties involved in 
the accounting for provisions for decommissioning costs (Abrahamson, 2014; Rogers and 
Atkins, 2015). According to Khurana et al. (2001), such complexities and uncertainties can 
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curtail incentives by oil and gas companies to provide detailed information about these cost 
provisions. Thus, we explored the views of interviewees on the accounting complexities and 
uncertainties and analysed how these may impact reporting practices of companies. We 
started by asking the interviewees for their views regarding the adequacy of existing 
accounting standards dealing with the accounting and reporting of provisions for 
decommissioning costs.  
The interviewees expressed awareness of IAS16, IAS37 and IFRIC 1 and were of the 
view that these standards provided a good basis for dealing with the accounting and reporting 
of provisions for decommissioning costs. They certainly did not advocate new accounting 
standards to deal with decommissioning costs. However, there was a general consensus that 
more guidance was needed on the application of the accounting standards in areas of 
difficulties. This need for guidance derives from the fact that decommissioning is a relatively 
immature activity (Royal Dutch Shell Oil, Annual Report, 2015, p110), thus precedents 
against which to benchmark accounting treatments for many of the items are non-existent. 
This creates difficulties for companies in accounting for, and therefore reporting of 
information on provisions for decommissioning costs. For example, highlighting the 
difficulties in the accounting treatment of decommissioning some assets, an interviewee from 
an oil and gas company commented:  
I think a pipeline bypass for example, one of our assets is being used as a pumping 
station, and we had to bypass it in order to decommission it. Is that an operating 
expenditure, or is it a capital expenditure?   
Integrated Planning and Appraisal Lead, Oil and Gas Company (O&GI3) 
 
Others concurred and directly pointed to their reliance on guidance provided by IFRIC 1 in 
the application of IAS16 and IAS37 to account for provisions for decommissioning costs. 
This is shown in the quotes from two oil and gas company interviewees who commented: 
There isn’t a separate standard called accounting for decommissioning costs, and 
IAS16 is not all that clear insofar as it relates to these costs... obviously, if it was that 
clear, they would never have needed to issue IFRIC1. We basically go on our 
interpretation of IAS16, IAS37, and IFRIC1, what they say to do, and IFRIC1 in 
particular.  
    Group Financial Accountant, oil and Gas company (O&GI2b) 
 
and; 
The IFRS can’t encompass every single possible item, but we still need interpretation 
and judgement to pick up the various parts of guidance that you see, and reach your 
reasoned conclusion, which then you would test the acceptance.   
Group Financial Controller, Oil and Gas Company (O&GI1) 
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These views demonstrate some of the difficulties that oil and gas companies experience in the 
application of IAS16 and IAS37. Potentially, these difficulties can lead to different outcomes. 
Firstly, different accounting treatments and reporting may arise across oil and gas companies, 
thus defeating the attempt to improve comparability. Secondly, and most importantly, they 
may create disincentives to report the information due to concerns about the credibility or the 
quality of the information. As suggested by Beyer et al. (2010), managers are often reluctant 
to release information that might turn out to be incorrect as the market judges them 
accordingly, with consequences for the company’s share valuation and cost of capital.  
The concern about credibility of the information is particularly evident when 
interviewees talk about the nature of decommissioning, which they view as extremely 
complex. A number of important points were expressed in this context, all of which have 
implications for reporting practice. The first complex issue relates to the accountants’ 
difficulties in understanding decommissioning terminologies and activities. This, in the view 
of the interviewees, makes it difficult to translate the information into credible cost estimates 
for publication in the annual reports. This point is exemplified in the following quote: 
..There are high pressure, high temperature wells, so for me as an accountant, say how 
much would it be to decommission this, I would need to go to university and study radio 
bio-engineering, other engineering, to be able to really understand the process and the 
costs to decommission our plants. And so, the actual costs that go in, I have to absolutely 
rely on a technical expert to help me with that.  
Deputy Chief Finance Officer, Oil and Gas Company (O&GI5). 
 
This was also raised by an expert academic with extensive experience in the oil and gas sector 
(ACA1), who states: 
My impression is that it’s very difficult [accounting for decommissioning costs]. When I 
talk to accountants, and largely the accountants I talk to on my training, I get the 
impression that they are not primarily responsible for gathering information. I think they 
are processing information. I don’t think they are actually going out and talking to 
consultants or contractors about the cost of doing it.  I think it’s probably quite difficult for 
them to do.   
 
The second complex issue raised by interviewees is the estimation of the decommissioning 
costs. The interviewees pointed out that, unlike other assets, the estimates are, in the main, too 
subjective and complicated because there are too many variables that have to be considered 
when arriving at an estimate. This makes the process costly to undertake. An interviewee 
from an oil and gas company commented: 
21 
 
A lot of it [estimates] is guesswork, but it is very important to understand the viability of a 
company. It [Decommissioning] is a very, very complex and expensive process. You need a 
lot of cash to do it and its very labour intensive. This makes cost estimations with some 
reasonable confidence a huge challenge for us. It is basically guesswork.  
Deputy Chief Finance Officer, Oil and Gas Company (O&GI5). 
 
These difficulties in estimating decommissioning costs, and therefore making appropriate 
provisions, is also evident in the accounting policies of oil and gas companies. For example: 
 
The decommissioning of offshore infrastructure is a relatively immature activity and 
consequently there is limited historical precedent against which to benchmark estimates of 
future costs. These factors increase the complexity involved in determining accurate 
accounting provisions that are material to Shell’s balance sheet. (Royal Dutch Shell Oil , 
Annual Report, 2015: 110).  
 
Tullow Oil’s policies also raise the same problems, thus: 
 
Decommissioning costs are uncertain and cost estimates can vary in response to many 
factors, including changes to the relevant legal requirements, the emergence of new 
technology or experience at other assets. The expected timing, work scope, amount of 
expenditure and risk weighting may also change. Therefore significant estimates and 
assumptions are made in determining the provision for decommissioning. (Tullow Oil, 
Annual Report, 2015: 81) 
 
These complexities are not only raised by the oil and gas companies, but also by regulators. 
For example, an interviewee from the Oil and Gas Authority (GOV3) pointed out that 
estimating decommissioning costs is a very complicated process and inaccuracies are bound 
to occur. These inaccuracies can have substantial implications for the company. For example, 
the company might have to re-state the cost provisions leading stakeholders, particularly the 
stock market, to lose confidence in the credibility of the company’s information, with 
consequences for share prices and the cost of capital (see Healy and Palepu, 2001; Beyer et 
al., 2010).  
The third complexity raised by nterviewees related to the fact that it takes many years 
before the assets are decommissioned, and in the interim, the law and accounting standards 
for decommissioning might change.
6
 Such changes have significant impact on the accuracy of 
the provisions that oil and gas companies make, and potentially influence how the company 
reports the information publicly. The problem with legislative changes was put forth 
eloquently by an oil and gas consultant interviewee (CONS1) stating:  
                                                 
6 This is also noted in the annual report of The Oil and Gas Development Company which states “Provision is based on the best estimates; 
however, the actual outflows can differ from estimated cash outflows due to changes in laws, regulations, public expectations, technology, 
prices and conditions, and can take place many years in the future. (Annual Report, 2015: 77) 
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At some point the government turns around and says, well actually, we did say we 
would give you relief, but actually we can’t afford it and we are not going to give that 
relief in the future. How do you anticipate and capture such changes when estimating 
the costs? It’s difficult. 
  
Other challenges addressed by interviewees are: defining the point of cessation of production 
(GOV2); defining the timing for decommissioning (O&GI1); identifying who will undertake 
the decommissioning process on behalf of the oil and gas company; defining the marginal oil 
price (O&GI3); changes in regulations and taxation (CONS1; GOV1); instability of the 
exchange rates, technology, the actual cost of decommissioning and availability of finance to 
undertake decommissioning (CONS2; GOV1); changes of fields’ ownership, subjectivity and 
uncertainty that affects budgeting for decommissioning.
7
  
Taken altogether, these problems create concerns about the quality of the information, thus 
influencing oil and gas companies’ decisions to provide sufficiently detailed information 
about the provisions for decommissioning costs. In particular, oil and gas companies perceive 
that disclosing greater information on decommissioning cost liabilities may exacerbate rather 
than reduce the information asymmetry problems between the company and its stakeholders. 
This view derives from the fact that because of the complexities in the estimations, 
stakeholders may not be able to process and understand the information, leading to 
misinterpretations. To this extent, oil and gas companies are concerned about the use of this 
information by stakeholders, thus reducing their incentives to commit to disclosing detailed 
information in the annual report. As expressed by one interviewee from an oil and gas 
company:   
We tend not to put too much information in there that isn’t required, because once you put 
something in there, it then gets a lot more scrutiny and people might not understand it.  
Group Financial Controller, Oil and Gas Company (O&GI1) 
 
This may also be interpreted as oil and gas companies seeking to avoid setting a disclosure 
precedent that they may not be able to maintain in the future. For example, the assumptions 
relating to decommissioning costs may change drastically between periods due to changes to 
environmental conditions. Any change on disclosure as a result might then potentially be 
wrongly interpreted by stakeholders as indicative of major problems, creating difficulties for 
the company. This is consistent with Gibbins et al., (1990) and Graham et al. (2005), who 
                                                 
7 The accounting policies of Europa Oil&Gas states “By its nature, the detailed scope of work required and timing is uncertain” (Annual 
Report, 2015: 50). Similarly, the independent auditor’s report  of EnQuest Plc states “The decommissioning provisions are also affected by 
changes in the oil and gas reserve estimates and price assumptions which determine the date on which production will cease“ (Annual 
Report, 2015: 80).  
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both find out that managers attempt to avoid setting disclosure precedents as this would have 
economic implications for the company if not maintained.     
 
5.2.3 Factors influencing reporting decisions 
In the previous section, we examined the views of stakeholders on complexities and 
uncertainties in accounting for decommissioning costs. These were seen as major 
impediments to reporting detailed information about provisions for decommissioning costs in 
the annual reports. In this section, we draw insights from the disclosure literature (see Healy 
and Palepu, 2001 and Beyer et al., 2010 for reviews) and examine further factors that may 
affect a company’s disclosure decisions. The disclosure literature argues that the decision to 
disclose information derives from the need to reduce information asymmetry between the 
company and its stakeholders. Such decisions are influenced by different factors such as 
regulations, agency-related costs, capital market pressures and proprietary costs. To 
understand these factors, we first explored interviewees’ views on the current reporting 
practices of oil and gas companies in respect of provisions for decommissioning costs.  
We find general agreement by the interviewees that the existing IAS reporting 
requirements for decommissioning costs are sufficient. The view of the interviewees is that 
the level of details to be provided must be left to oil and gas companies to decide voluntarily 
instead of via regulation. However, while regulators, academics and consultants were 
supportive of voluntary disclosure, they were critical about current reporting practices by oil 
and gas companies. In particular, they pointed out that the reporting practices of some oil and 
gas companies, for example providing a single numerical figure without detailed explanations, 
does not help understanding of decommissioning cost liabilities and the potential effects on 
the company’s future cash flows. These views were echoed eloquently by an academic 
interviewee (ACA1): 
Do I want to see pages and pages in an annual report? No, but there should be enough 
detail in there that shareholders and the analyst community can use to assess the 
liabilities of a company; like any other liability, if there is an outstanding contract 
dispute or there is another kind of legal liability they have, it should be explained, what 
the liabilities of the company are. Currently for decommissioning costs, this does not 
exist in annual reports. 
 
A consultant interviewee (CONS2) also commented along similar lines:   
    
With just one figure, it’s very difficult for anyone to judge it from that one figure, you 
don’t know how good the calculations are behind it [provisions for decommissioning 
costs], you don’t know if everything is included, you don’t know what assumptions have 
been made. That doesn’t really help those interested in the information. 
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These views are consistent with the results of our content analysis phase, which demonstrated 
that there is no, or very little (if any), extra information in the annual reports to aid 
stakeholder understanding of some of the decommissioning cost figures reported. To this 
extent, oil and gas companies can be seen as failing to reduce the information asymmetry 
between the companies and shareholders, investors and other stakeholders. Interestingly, 
interviewees of oil and gas companies also agree that disclosure could be improved via 
voluntary rather than mandatory means. As one oil and gas company interviewee puts it: 
I think in my mind they [IASs 16 and 37] provide enough. They cannot encompass 
every single possible item or detail. We still need interpretation and judgement, and 
reach a reasonable conclusion as to how much detail to give out. So, I would not be 
pushing for any new regulatory reporting requirements. No.  
 Integrated Planning and Appraisal Lead, Oil and Gas Company (O&GI3) 
 
This view reflects the belief that because the IAS/IFRS are principle-based standards, the oil 
and gas companies must be left to apply professional judgments in decisions as to whether 
they should provide information beyond minimum requirements. Despite this view, most oil 
and gas companies’ disclosure strategy appears to focus on only providing the very minimum 
information required by accounting standards. Our analyses of the interviews suggest that this 
disclosure strategy stems from three key influential factors. First, in line with the work of 
Gibbins et al. (1990), it was clear that the oil and gas companies’ attitude towards disclosure 
of information about provisions for decommissioning costs is driven by regulatory 
requirements. That is, their strategy is to just comply with the minimum disclosure 
requirements of IAS/IFRS, with no or little desire for voluntary and detailed disclosure. This 
position is summed up by a decommissioning compliance manager of a large oil and gas 
company (O&GI2a): 
Well, put it this way, from my own sitting, we disclose what we have to under GAAP. I 
think we do, if I’m being honest, the minimum disclosures we are required to do. We 
don’t deliberately seek to disclose more or less than what is required in the annual 
reports. It comes down to the point of view that they [detailed disclosures] are not 
required to be honest. There is nothing that says that we [oil and gas companies] have 
to give any more information than we already do. 
 
Given this adoption of a disclosure strategy that focuses on minimum compliance with 
mandatory requirements, it appears that if regulatory authorities, for example stock 
exchanges or accounting standard bodies, were to call for detailed disclosures to be provided 
in the annual reports, oil and gas companies would respond. Indeed, the interviewees 
expressed the desire to avoid negative consequences of non-compliance with disclosure 
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requirements. As articulated by one interviewee, a deputy finance managers in an oil and gas 
company (O&GI5):  
It’s [non-compliance] very costly, there are penalties, it’s embarrassing for the board 
of directors, and you are misleading shareholders. It could be very embarrassing for the 
company, for the external auditors too. 
 
Thus, as meeting regulatory disclosure requirements is particularly important for these 
companies, the opportunity for regulators to improve these disclosures exists. In fact, the 
detailed information already exists and provided, albeit confidentially, to the regulatory 
authorities such as the UK Oil and Gas Authority. As noted by a finance and legacy manager 
(O&GI4) of one of the companies: 
So, in [name of company] annual reports, you see decommissioning and restoration 
provisions actually combined with other provisions in the balance sheet. The 
breakdown of the provisions is provided to the UK government confidentially and the 
government aggregates it to produce an annual report, which talks about this £40 
billion in decommissioning that they expect over the next 30 or 40 years. So, this gives 
people a guide but it doesn’t give people the specifics, such as how much… [name of 
company] is spending on Brent Spar or on another asset.  
 
This implies that companies could provide the information at no or little extra preparatory 
costs. 
 The second factor we identified relates to the demand for information by stakeholders 
such as investors, shareholders, environmental activist groups and the public at large. The 
literature suggests that because disclosure of information is costly (Verrecchia, 1990; Healy 
and Palepu, 2001), it will only be forthcoming when there is demand for the information by 
external stakeholders (see Gibbins et al., 1990). Such demand creates (dis)incentives for 
managers to disclose and reduce information asymmetry between stakeholders and the 
company. It was clear from our interviewees that demand for information by stakeholders was 
an important consideration for reporting information about provisions for decommissioning 
costs. In particular, the interviewees of oil and gas companies expressed the general view that 
stakeholders neither wanted nor understood the information about provisions for 
decommissioning costs. These views are exemplified in the following two comments: 
I am not sure that the general public, investors, shareholders, and others, have a lot of 
awareness of it, really. If our Investor Relations people are saying to us, even the 
institutional investors don’t seem all that bothered about it [decommissioning cost 
information], then you could argue that it’s actually not that important to them.  
Group Financial Accountant, Oil and Gas company (O&GI2b) 
and; 
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People rarely look at this or …even ask for it, for example, analysts and shareholders. 
They don’t ask you about all this stuff [provisions for decommissioning costs] ….., how 
you got to that and are you massaging, for example. They are looking at cash flows, they 
are looking at cash flow generation and they are looking at debts, if you have got any 
debts, and that’s how they will assess your company. And that’s why decommissioning, 
they will look at ours and say well you are not decommissioning anything until 2034. Not 
interested. Yes, I am not going to ask about that.  
Deputy Chief Finance Officer, Oil and Gas Company (O&GI5) 
 
The basic view from the oil and gas companies is that if the information is not demanded by 
stakeholders, there is no need to expend costs to disclose it. Thus, even though the detailed 
information is already available in their information systems (as provided to regulatory 
authorities), the lack of stakeholder demand provides a disincentive to disclose it in annual 
reports. This is consistent with findings of Gibbins et al. (1990) that show that companies’ 
disclosure strategy responds to external stimuli for disclosure. However, these views by the 
oil and gas companies are surprising and at odds with prior work on decommissioning cost 
information. For example, Khurana et al. (2001) provide evidence to show that provisions for 
decommissioning costs are value relevant for share valuations. This suggests that the capital 
market participants use the information for making investment decisions. To this extent, 
providing detailed disclosures of this information would help reduce information asymmetry 
between the company and capital markets. This reduction in information asymmetry would 
benefit the capital markets by providing better insights into the companies’  financial 
positions and their ability to meet the obligations as they fall due and therefore give a better 
understanding of the implications for the future cash flows.  
 The third and final factor brought out from the interviews, as affecting the disclosure of 
detailed information about provisions for decommissioning costs, relates to proprietary costs. 
According to the disclosure literature (see Dye, 1986; Verrecchia, 1990; Li et al., 1997), 
proprietary costs create incentives for companies to withhold information from stakeholders. 
The proprietary costs noted by our interviewees included increased public scrutiny, potential 
misinterpretation by users and release of strategic information. There was a uniformity of 
views relating to concerns about increased public scrutiny and the potential misinterpretation 
of  information. The perceived effects of these two costs on the company were seen as 
particularly important in company decisions regarding the disclosure of information about 
provisions for decommissioning costs. A group accountant of an Oil and Gas Company 
(O&GI2b) pointed out: 
I am involved in the annual report and accounts process each year, and there are all 
sorts of considerations in terms of what level of information we put in there. We tend 
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not to put too much in there that isn’t required, because once you put something in 
there, it then gets a lot more scrutiny and, people might not understand it, might 
misinterpret it because it’s complex, and there are implications for our share price, 
for our reputation. 
 
From the oil and gas companies’ perspective, increased scrutiny and misinterpretation arise 
because stakeholders cannot understand the complexities and uncertainties relating to the 
determination of provisions for decommissioning costs. As we noted earlier, the complexities 
and uncertainties in the estimation of decommissioning costs are, in the view of interviewees, 
too subjective to be relied on. To interviewees the capital markets, and stakeholders in 
general, may be concerned by the level of cost provisions even though their estimation is 
highly subjective. In particular, because stakeholders might view the high decommissioning 
cost provisions as indicative of the actual future cash outflows and the ability of the company 
to decommission, they may respond negatively to the information. This could have substantial 
effects on the company as it brings unnecessary public scrutiny and may harm the company’s 
reputation. The issue of an ability to process information or misinterpretation of information 
is also raised in Kim and Verricchia (1994) and Coller and Yohn (1997) as creating further 
information asymmetries between the company and its stakeholders. Such misinterpretation 
affects share prices and the cost of capital of the company (Coles et al., 1995; Lambert et al., 
2007; Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2016). To this extent, these types of proprietary costs (i.e., 
public scrutiny and misinterpretation of information) play an important role in decisions by oil 
and gas companies to disclose information about provisions for decommissioning costs.  
Whilst the above might be true, these views by oil and gas companies also appear to 
contradict the disclosure literature in two ways. Firstly, from the perspectives of agency and 
signalling theories (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Hughes, 1986), oil and gas companies should 
be publishing detailed information rather than just a single figure on provisions for 
decommissioning costs. Detailed disclosures would help clarify the amounts, thus allaying 
investor fears that managers may be concealing important information about the ability of the 
company to meet decommissioning obligations. This will reduce information asymmetry and 
improve liquidity of the company’s shares leading to increasing share prices and, therefore, 
reducing the cost of capital (Hughes, 1986; Coles et al., 1995; see also Healy and Palepu, 
2001 for a review). Secondly, oil and gas companies are already in the public eye due to the 
environmental impact of their operations (Li et al., 1997; Peters and Romi, 2013). As Li et al. 
(1997) argue, because of their operations, the legitimacy of oil and gas companies is always 
threatened. To this extent, one would expect these companies to increase information 
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disclosure about provisions for decommissioning costs to inform stakeholders about their 
financial strength and preparedness to clean-up and remedy the environmental damage. This 
would reduce, rather than increase public scrutiny, as detailed information might change 
stakeholder perceptions about the company’s operations. Consequently, we asked about this 
issue and the interviewees of oil and gas companies indicated that there are strategies other 
than disclosing information in an annual report by which they manage stakeholder 
perceptions. These involve well-coordinated engagement with the primary stakeholders. For 
these companies, the primary stakeholders include shareholders, investors, regulators, 
environmental groups and the public in general (see also Alciatore et al., 2004; Monciardini, 
2016). As put forth by one interviewee:  
I think for a project like Brent, which is obviously in the public eye, there is a whole 
stakeholder engagement process which is deliberate and very well-coordinated, to 
make sure that the project and the way it is being approached is properly understood 
by our stakeholders…. This does not involve the annual report. 
Integrated Planning and Appraisal Lead (O&GI3) 
 
This suggests that oil and gas companies may be engaging in private communications with 
their primary stakeholders about their plans and ability to decommission their assets when 
due. This appears to be consistent with Holland (1998) who found that companies engage in 
private disclosure in order to communicate some of their strategies rather than publicly 
disclosing the information in the annual reports. Thus, to the extent that the primary 
stakeholders are well-engaged and informed about the decommissioning costs and funding 
plans, they may not put pressure on oil and gas companies to publicly release the information 
in annual reports. 
Finally, with regard to divulging confidential information, only two interviewees talked 
about decommissioning cost information as being of strategic importance. In particular, 
information on the cessation of production of any particular oil and gas field was considered 
as too confidential to publicly disclose as this is linked to the company’s future prospects. 
Disclosing this type of information was seen as creating a competitive disadvantage for the 
company. The concern that releasing confidential information may hurt companies is well-
documented in the literature (see Bebbington et al., 2008; Beattie and Smith, 2012; McChlery 
et al., 2015). For example, among other things, potentially, disclosing the information may aid 
competitors in assessing the attractiveness of a particular oil and/or gas field or location, 
leading to new entrants (Ellis et al., 2012). This cost of disclosing information is exemplified 
in the quote by the finance manager of a large oil and gas company (O&GI4):   
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Information about decommissioning can be strategic information, and companies don’t 
want to disclose these too, in the public domain, and make it available for competitors. 
In particular, the one thing that has sensitivity specifically around it, in the way we turn 
an estimate into a balance sheet disclosed number, is the year that we are discounting 
back from, because obviously the cessation of production year is very confidential, and 
we don’t want to disclose when we believe assets are ceasing production. There are lots 
of reasons, but it’s people’s jobs, it’s the future of our company. I don’t think we would 
make those disclosures easily public. Certainly, when we talk amongst industry groups 
that’s something that we are all very conscious of.  
 
Thus, divulging confidential information, competitive and otherwise, is an important factor 
influencing the disclosure of information about provisions for decommissioning costs in the 
annual reports of oil and gas companies. 
6. Conclusion 
In the context of the magnitude of decommissioning obligations in the oil and gas sector and 
the concern about the environmental impact of oil and gas companies, there have been 
growing calls for these companies to disclose more information about these obligations (see 
Standard and Poor’s, 2007; Rogers and Atkins, 2015; Monciardini, 2016). In this study, we 
contribute to these calls by investigating compliance with international accounting standards’ 
disclosure requirements relating to the provisions for decommissioning costs by oil and gas 
companies. Primarily, we examined the extent to which oil and gas companies comply with 
IASs 16 and 37 disclosure requirements. We also investigated the perception of selected key 
stakeholders on the reporting practices of oil and gas companies and the factors perceived as 
influencing such reporting practices. An understanding of compliance with mandatory 
disclosure requirements and reporting practices relating to provisions for decommissioning 
costs in general is of importance to regulators and other stakeholders. Thus, our findings have 
important implications for regulators in making decisions relating to the improvement of 
reporting of information for the benefit of stakeholders. In this case, given the reluctance by 
oil and gas companies to disclose detailed information, regulators might consider increasing 
the minimum disclosure requirements for provisions for decommissioning costs. 
We find that the level of compliance with disclosure requirements was substantially 
high, with about 53% of oil and gas companies in our sample complying with over 70% of 
the requirements. However, what is evident is that full compliance is not achieved. More 
importantly, our analyses demonstrate that oil and gas companies appear to take a tick-box 
approach to compliance with IASs 16 and 37, providing the very minimum required 
information in the annual reports. In most cases, they provided only single numerical 
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disclosure of provisions for decommissioning costs with no additional explanations to aid 
understanding. This practice appears to derive from the fact that IAS/IFRS are principle-
based standards and require oil and gas companies to apply professional judgements in their 
interpretation and application. Nonetheless, we conclude that the current disclosure 
requirements need to be reconsidered to ensure that stakeholders are provided with relevant 
and detailed information about provisions for decommissioning costs of oil and gas 
companies.   
We identified a number of reasons for the disclosure practice by the oil and gas 
companies. First, the complexities and uncertainties involved in the estimation of the 
provisions for decommissioning costs were identified as an important impediment to 
disclosure. In particular, the subjectivity by which the provisions are estimated raises 
concerns about the credibility of information conveyed to the stakeholders and how 
stakeholders might react to the information. Such concerns create a disincentive for 
disclosing the information by oil and gas companies. Second, disclosure of provisions for 
decommissioning costs was driven by regulatory requirements, that is the requirements of 
IASs 16 and 37. Companies were more focused on providing the minimum requirements with 
little or no extra disclosures. It was clear that in the absence of additional mandatory 
requirements, oil and gas companies were unwilling to provide detailed disclosures of 
decommissioning costs beyond that required by the accounting standards. Therefore, 
regualtors may need to consider improving the level of detail required to be disclosed by the 
oil and gas companies.  
The third factor affecting disclosure decisions derives from the external demand for 
information. In this regard, the view of oil and gas companies was that because stakeholders 
did not demand the information on provisions for decommissioning costs, it was not 
necessary to disclose the detailed information. Thus, it appears that disclosure of provisions 
for decommissioning costs is not influenced by the desire to reduce information asymmetry 
voluntarily and reducing agency-related costs. Neither is it affected by incentives to signal to 
the capital market the quality of the company  nor by reducing the cost of capital.  
Finally, proprietary costs were also a major factor in the decision to report the 
information. In particular, oil and gas companies considered competitive disadvantage, 
information misinterpretation and increased public scrutiny as driving their disclosure 
strategies on provisions for decommissioning costs. The cost of misinterpretation of 
information and increased public scrutiny were major considerations. 
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Our findings must be interpreted in the context of a number of limitations. Although 
our sample is an improvement on prior studies, it is not substantially large and future studies 
can improve on the sample size. The number of companies included in the content analysis is 
limited to those that are listed on the LSE, and have decommissioning liabilities. However, 
these limitations are highlights for further research on the same topic that extends the sample 
to oil and gas companies listed on a number of international stock markets. Further studies on 
the users’ satisfaction of the current disclosure practices of provisions for decommissioning 
oil and gas assets and demand for further disclosers is worth undertaking.     
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Companies Annual Reports and Accounts  
Empyrean Energy Plc, 2015 
Europa Oil&Gas, 2015 
EnQuest Plc, 2015 
The Oil and Gas Development Company, 2015 
Rose Petroleum Plc, 2015 
Royal Dutch Shell Oil, 2015 
Tullow Oil, 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Sample of Oil and Gas Companies 
Total number of companies on both main LSE and AIM  122 
Less: Companies with no revenues and no provisions 40  
         None exploration and production companies 3  
         Companies not engaged in oil or gas production 11 -53 
Final number of companies in the sample  68 
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Sample Analysis:   
1. By Listing 
  Main Market 
 
9 
AIM 
 
59 
  Total  68 
 
2. By country of origin   
United Kingdom  17 
Africa   7 
Europe 
 
5 
Russia 7 
South America 3 
USA 7 
India 5 
Central Asia and Caspian 3 
The Caribean 1 
Mediterranean basin 1 
Rest of the World 12 
  
Total 
 
68 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: List of interviewees    
 
Interview Organisation Code Job Title Duration of 
Interview 
Date of 
Interview 
Mode of 
Interview 
1 DBEIS 
GOV1a 
 
Head of Offshore 
Decommissioning Unit 
28 minutes 16.05.2016 Telephone 
GOV1b 
Senior Decommissioning 
Manager 
37 
 
2 Oil and Gas 
Authority 
 
GOV2 
Infrastructure 
Decommissioning 
Manager UKCS 
 
30 minutes 13.05.2016 Telephone 
3 GOV3 
Senior Accountancy 
Advisor 
22 minutes 23.05.2016 Telephone 
4 
Oil and Gas 
Industry 
 
O&GI1 
Group Financial 
Controller 
37 minutes 21.06.2016 Telephone 
5 
O&GI2a 
 
Decommissioning 
Compliance Manager 
32 minutes 10.06.2016 Telephone 
O&GI2b 
Group Financial 
Accountant 
6 O&GI3 
Integrated Planning and 
Appraisal Lead 
52 minutes 16.05.2016 Telephone 
7 O&GI4 
Finance and Legacy 
Manager 
60 minutes 05.05.2016 Telephone 
8 O&G I5 
Deputy Chief Finance 
Officer 
40 minutes 20.05.2016 Face-to-face 
9 
Academic 
 
ACA1 
Chartered Accountant 
and Academic Instructor 
25 minutes 16.05.2016 Telephone 
10 ACA2 
Director of Oil and Gas 
Institute 
25 minutes 03.06.2016 Telephone 
11 
Independent 
Consultant 
 
CONS1 
Independent 
Decommissioning 
Consultant 
31 minutes 15.06.2016 Telephone 
12 CONS2 
Independent 
Decommissioning 
Consultant 
50 minutes 25.05.2016 Face-to-face 
13 Auditor 
AUD1a 
 
Partner 
 
30 minutes 16.06.2016 Telephone 
AUD1b 
Global Oil & Gas 
Assurance Leader 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Results of content analysis—Descriptive statistics        
  
Panel A: Overall Disclosure Scores 
 Mean Std  Dev Minimum Maximum 
Overall disclosure index:  
       All items 
 
.634 
 
.243 
 
0.00 
 
1.00 
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       With items 1 and 12 excluded .711 .269 0.00 1.00 
 
Panel B: Distribution of Overall Disclosure Scores 
Score range All items included Items 1 and 12 Excluded 
Score range No of firms % No of firms % 
0 to under 50%  14 20.5 13 19.1 
50% to under 60% 8 11.8 1 1.5 
60% to under 70% 10 14.7 8 11.8 
70% to under 80% 18 26.5 10 14.7 
80% to 100% 18 26.5 36 52.9 
Totals 68 100 68 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Test for differences in disclosure compliance among companies: T-tests      
 
Panel A: Overall compliance disclosure scores 
 Size of company Magnitude of decommissioning costs 
Disclosure  Main Market AIM t-stats High Low t-stats 
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 Mean Mean  Mean Mean  
All items .654 .641 .159 .625 .663 -.671 
 
Panel B: Disclosure by individual items 
   
Item Number     
1 .100 .051 .576 .114 .000 2.001** 
2 1.000 .842 1.349* .828 .906 -.923 
3 .500 .544 .253 .600 .469 1.069 
4 .900 .632 1.677** .657 .688 -.261 
5 .900 .947 -.576 .886 1.000 -2.001** 
6 .800 .772 .194 .743 .813 -.675 
7 .800 .754 .308 .686 .843 -1.519* 
8 .700 .702 -.011 .600 .813 1.923** 
9 .600 .719 -.752 .688 .719 -.291 
10 .800 .702 .628 .657 .781 -1.119 
11 .600 .544 .325 .571 .531 .326 
12 .100 .053 .576 .086 .031 .932 
13 .700 .877 -1.452* .829 .875 -.526 
14 .200 .316 -.730 .343 .250 .821 
15 .900 .824 .587 .800 .875 -.820 
16 .800 .824 -.184 .800 .844 -.460 
17 .700 .807 -.759 .743 .844 -1.007 
** Significant at the 5% level or better; * Significant at the 10% level or better 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1: Checklist 
Item 
Number 
Description 
IAS37.25 requires that: 
1 In the “extremely rare” cases where an entity cannot make a reliable estimate 
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of the future obligation and so cannot make a provision, the costs of 
decommissioning should be treated as a contingent liability and the following 
disclosed: 
    -A brief description of the of the nature of the contingent liability 
Where practical 
- An estimate of the financial effect measured under 
IAS37.36-52 
- An indication of the uncertainties relating to the 
amount and timing of outflows 
- The possibility of any reimbursement 
 
IAS37.45-47 requires that: 
2 
Where the effect of the time value of money is material the provision should 
be the present value of the expenditure required to settle the obligation 
 
3 
The discount rate used should be a “pre-tax rate (or rates) that reflect(s) 
current market assessments of the time value of money and the risks specific 
to the liability.” 
 
IAS37.59 requires that: 
4 
Provisions are revised annually to reflect the current best estimate of the final 
provision 
 
IAS37.84 requires that for each class of provision an entity shall disclose: 
 
5 
the carrying amount at the beginning and end of the period  
 
6 
additional provisions made in the period, including increases to existing 
provisions 
7 
amounts used (i.e. incurred and charged against the provision) during the 
period  
 
8 
unused amounts reversed during the period  
 
9 
the increase during the period in the discounted amount arising from the 
passage of time and the effect of any change in the discount rate  
 
IAS37.85 requires an entity to disclose the following for each class of provision: 
10 
A brief description of the nature of the obligation and the expected timing of 
any resulting outflows of economic benefits 
 
11 
An indication of the uncertainties about the amount or timing of those 
outflows. Where necessary to provide adequate information, an entity shall 
disclose the major assumptions made concerning future events, as addressed 
in paragraph 48 
12 
The amount of any expected reimbursement, stating the amount of any asset 
that has been recognised for that expected reimbursement 
 
IAS16 requires the following: 
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13 
That the total cost of the asset, that includes the decommissioning provision, 
be depreciated over the useful life of that asset  
 
14 
Disclosure of increase or decrease of assets due to adjustments of provisions 
for decommissioning costs 
 
IFRIC 1 requires the following: 
15 
The unwinding of the discount must be recognised in the P&L as a finance 
cost as it occurs [IFRIC 1.8]. Note: the unwinding is not deemed to be a 
borrowing cost as defined in IAS23 and thus cannot be capitalised under that 
standard [IFRIC 1.BC26-27] 
 
16 
Changes in the estimated cost of decommissioning through either a change in 
the anticipated cash outflows or in the discount rate used should not be taken 
to the P&L as they occur, but should be recognised in the carrying value of 
the related asset or in “other comprehensive income” depending upon 
whether the asset is measured at cost or using the revaluation model. [IFRIC 
1.4-7] 
17 
Any significant increase in decommissioning costs should trigger an 
impairment review [IFRIC 1.5] 
 
 
 
 
